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I. INTRODUCTION
I had earlier been invited to focus on the Canadian proposal for
enhanced surveillance of international financial systems. However, the
depth and breadth of the current global economic crisis, rapid
developments, and the scope of international response prompt me to be
more expansive about Canada's and the G-7's, approach to the challenges
of the global economy.
The international economy has entered a period of turmoil not seen for
a very long time and it is far from easy to predict how long the uncertainty
and volatility will last. What began as a financial crisis in Asia in the
summer of 1997 has evolved into a broader and deeper global economic
crisis which concerns and affects us all.
More than ever, in our search for solutions, all of our countries
recognize our global interdependence. And, we also recognize that our
domestic economies are increasingly affected by the overall international
situation.
II. CAUSES OF THE CRISIS
While we are still looking for the right answers, we have gained some
understanding of some of the factors that have led to this global crisis.
There is no doubt that the same rapid economic growth that caused
Asian countries to be dubbed the miracle economies contributed to the
Asian crisis. Over the past three decades, per capita income levels
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increased tenfold in Korea, fivefold in Thailand, and fourfold in Malaysia.
In Hong Kong and Singapore per capita income levels now exceed those in
some Western industrial countries. And until the current crisis, Asia
attracted almost half of total private capital inflows to developing countries
over $100 billion in 1996.
So, given the many years of outstanding economic performance, how
could the crisis occur? An IMF report tells us that Thailand, the first
country to be seriously hit, experienced large macroeconomic imbalances,
a marked slowdown in export growth, a current account deficit that was
persistently large and financed increasingly by short-term inflows, and a
real exchange rate that had appreciated to a level that appeared
unsustainable in part due to circumstances beyond their control, as
reflected in the wide swings in the yen-dollar rate. These problems, in
turn, exposed other weaknesses in the economy, including substantial,
unhedged foreign borrowing by the private sector, an inflated property
market, and a weak and over-exposed financial system. These weaknesses
reflected undisciplined foreign lending and weak domestic policies.
Developments in Thailand prompted market participants, especially
those who had initially underestimated the problems, to take a much closer
look at the risks in neighboring countries. It was evident that many of the
problems in Thailand existed in varying degrees in much of the Asian
region. These included overvalued real estate markets, weak and poorly
supervised banking sectors, and substantial private short-term borrowing in
foreign currency.
Markets began to look more critically at weaknesses that had
previously been considered minor, or at least manageable, given time.
Market doubts were compounded by a lack of transparency in financial
systems. These systems were characterized by lax enforcement of
prudential rules and inadequate supervision and associated lending practices
that led to a sharp deterioration in the quality of bank loan portfolios, and
problems of data availability. This hindered market participants from
maintaining a realistic view of economic fundamentals and added to
uncertainty about governance and political regimes. This crisis of
confidence led to reluctance of foreign creditors to roll over short-term
loans and caused downward pressure on currencies and stock markets.
In Asia, international investors looking for high yields underestimated
the risks involved. The downturn in the health of the Asian economies and
shifts in international competitiveness proved to make their investments
unsustainable. Fears of contagion have surfaced in the current reality of
Brazil, which remains vulnerable to external shocks, while it seeks
salvation through tough fiscal measures and an IMF package. Brazil's
proposed measures are aimed at reducing a mushrooming public sector
deficit which is eroding investor confidence and inviting currency
pressures. Success in deficit reduction would allow the government to
lower benchmark interest rates from levels exceeding 40%. The high rates
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were adopted to forestall a looming currency collapse provoked by last
August's turmoil in Russia.
The crisis in Russia reflects the confluence of three critical
situations. First, as a resource exporter Russia has been severely affected
by the fall in world commodity prices. The government's budget, already
strained by poor tax collection, took a severe hit when oil export revenues
fell. Second, was Russia's political crisis, where the continuing instability
of successive governments has resulted in an inability to move forward
with necessary reforms, including tax reform, better accounting practices
and bankruptcy procedures, elimination of subsidies to unproductive
sectors, and concerted effort to improve governance, both public and
private. Third, the global crisis of confidence in emerging markets hit
Russia-capital flight accelerated, pushing the ruble's value down sharply,
and resulting in Russia's inability to pay debts, both public and private.
III. SEEKING SOLUTIONS
The G-7 and the international financial institutions are seeking
solutions to ensure that international finance and the global economy can be
managed to ensure stability and growth, to minimize adverse consequences
including social impacts, and, to ensure the avoidance of crises.
Canada's Finance Minister, Paul Martin, stated in his October 1998
Economic and Fiscal Update: "Until recently we've seen and benefited
from several years of significant economic expansion around the world.
Now we are seeing globalization's other face. . . . Very clearly, the global
economy has entered uncharted waters. This might well be the first real
test of the stability and sustainability of globalization."
How are G-7 countries, including Canada, addressing the challenges
of globalization?
The challenges are both immediate and longer term, covering the
financial, economic, and social dimensions of the global situation and the
interlinkages, both domestic and international.
On the financial front, we believe it is necessary to take immediate
steps towards restoring confidence in the most affected economies. We
must ensure our citizens enjoy systems that are safe, sound, and efficient.
Prudential regulation, designed to require prudent conduct on the part of
regulated financial institutions and to minimize the occurrence and cost of
failures, is key, as are consumer protection and privacy issues, without
intruding on the ability of financial institutions to operate as businesses.
We recognize that on the international front, concerns remain about
the rapid increase and globalization of international financial flows. On
balance, we believe that an open and liberal system of capital movement is
highly beneficial. By facilitating the movement of savings to their most
productive uses, liberalized capital flows can have a positive impact on
investment and growth, and on economic prosperity. For these efforts to
be realized, however, capital account liberalization needs to proceed in an
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orderly manner. Including an appropriate mix of macroeconomic and
exchange rate policies, sequencing liberalization with structural measures,
especially in the monetary and financial sector, and pacing liberalization to
the circumstances of individual countries.
Cooperation and concerted action by like-minded countries is
especially critical. That is why the efforts of the G-7 to strengthen the
global financial system is so important. These reforms, begun at the 1995
Halifax Summit, have assumed far more meaning in the past year as we
have all struggled to come to terms with the Asian financial crisis, which
evolved into a global crisis.
Canada, as an active participant in the G-7 effort, has been
particularly concerned about finding ways to ensure that international
financial sector supervisory regimes become stronger and more transparent
in order to lessen the likelihood and severity of possible future financial
crises. Last spring, Canada proposed enhanced surveillance of
international financial systems that could take the form of peer review. We
brought this to the attention of APEC Finance Ministers in May at the
meeting hosted by Canada in Kananaskis, Alberta, and to G-7 Leaders at
Birmingham. This concept was widely endorsed, and was recently
incorporated into a Canadian six-point plan to deal with the global financial
turmoil, announced by our Finance Minister on September 29.
This six-point plan includes:
1. Ensuring appropriate monetary policy through G-7 central
banks paying close attention and giving appropriate weight to the
risk of a further slowdown in the global economy;
2. A renewed commitment by the emerging economies to
sound macroeconomic and structural policy;
3. Expeditious action to strengthen national financial systems
and international oversight;
4. Development of a practical guide or roadmap for safe
capital liberalization in developing countries;
5. Agreement to work towards a better mechanism to involve
private sector investors in the resolution of financial crises; and
6. Greater attention to the needs of the poorest countries to
ensure they receive the resources and support they need to reduce
poverty and begin growing.
This plan is designed to address the most immediate dangers by
ensuring interest rates support continuing sustainable growth, promoting a
sound policy environment in the emerging markets, and ensuring that the
poorest countries receive support for poverty alleviation.
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The Canadian plan is also designed to address the underlying causes of
financial instability by strengthening financial sector supervision, ensuring
that private investors bear their share of the financial burden during times
of crises, and in helping developing countries to liberalize their capital
markets safely and securely.
The elements of our six-point plan are reflected strongly in the
Declaration by G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors and a
G-7 Leaders Statement on the World Economy, issued on October 30.
These statements highlighted various steps already being taken to
strengthen confidence in the world economy, including progress made
towards agreeing on the IMF Quota increase and the New Arrangements to
Borrow; the reduction of interest rates by several countries including
Canada, the USA, Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, and several other
European countries, to help maintain strong growth without jeopardizing
commitment to low inflation; policy commitments by Brazil which the G-7
would support; a commitment of resources by Japan to strengthen the
financial system; and progress made in Asian economies toward
establishing the foundation for recovery.
Leaders also welcomed the Finance Ministers' proposals for
immediate financing arrangements to ward off destabilizing market
contagion, including establishing an enhanced IMF facility to provide, if
necessary, a precautionary line of credit for countries pursuing IMF-
approved policies, accompanied as appropriate by bilateral finance and
private sector involvement; and agreement to establish a World Bank
facility to provide, in times of crisis, support for most vulnerable groups,
financial sector restructuring, and increased use of financing tools to
encourage private flows.
The G-7 Leaders and Finance Ministers did address longer term
architectural reforms for the global marketplace that would capture the full
benefits of international capital flows and global markets, minimize the risk
of disruption, and better protect the most vulnerable. These longer term
measures include global action to promote greater openness in the financial
operation of domestic financial and corporate institutions, and IFIs,
including through internationally agreed codes of good practice to increase
transparency of governments' fiscal and monetary policies, and to
strengthen corporate governance; enhancing surveillance of national
financial and regulatory systems, with better cooperation between national
authorities and key IFI and regulatory bodies; orderly and progressive
capital account liberalization; cooperative resolution of future crises,
particularly mechanisms to involve the private sector; and principles of
good practice in social policy and the development of adjustment
programmes to protect the most vulnerable groups in response to crises.
Leaders called on their Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
to also pursue further proposals to strengthen the financial system,
including strengthening financial systems in emerging markets, establishing
a process for surveillance of the international financial system, maintaining
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sustainable exchange rate regimes in emerging markets backed by
macroeconomic policies that promote stability, developing new forms of
official finance and promoting a greater role for the private sector in
addressing crises, and encouraging policies to minimize the human cost of
financial crises.
Canada was particularly insistent that the G-7 Leaders' Statement
include reference to the impact of the crisis on the poor and most
vulnerable, the need to engage the private sector in restoring financial and
economic confidence, and the importance of open markets through trade
and investment liberalization within the framework of the WTO.
On the broader economic front, we are working to maintain and foster
sound economic fundamentals that build strong and resilient economies.
The macroeconomic prescription reduction of deficits, keeping interest
rates and inflation low is being encouraged. We are also working to
promote business climates conducive to the development of SMES and
enhanced job creation. We recognize the need to put in place policies that
ensure a smooth transition to a more knowledge-based and technological
society.
And we must also keep markets open. This involves actions designed
to restore the conduct of business such as opening lines of credit,
delivering on our intentions to keep markets open, and making progress on
APEC early voluntary sectoral liberalization. We are mindful of carefully
managing public expectations through engagement with civil society.
Increasingly, we recognize that financial and economic crises have
social consequences and that, as stated by Joseph Stiglitz of the World
Bank, the poor and most vulnerable often carry a disproportionate burden.
In the short term, on the social front, it is important that aid to most
affected countries is appropriately targeted given fiscal constraints and the
drying up of capital flows. As need arises, bilateral and/or multilateral
efforts will be undertaken for food aid and distribution (or other forms of
humanitarian assistance) to hard-hit countries such as Indonesia and Russia.
IV. THE CONTINUING AGENDA
Our work is not over. We recognize that reform of the international
financial system is an ongoing process. The momentum for reform begun
in Halifax in 1995, and reaffirmed at Denver, Birmingham, and in the
recent G-7 Statement, must be maintained. We also recognize that the
global crisis has longer term and wide-spread impacts, not only on the
financial and business communities but on the lives of the citizens of
affected countries. There are, therefore, many issues that we continue to
grapple with in our search for solutions.
On the financial front, we must, of course, be vigilant in ensuring
effective implementation of the G-7 Finance Ministers' and Central Bank
Governors Declaration. We will be tackling difficult issues and posing
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challenging questions as we continue the agenda to reform international
financial tools to ensure global economic stability and growth.
1. Is there agreement that the IMF should be policeman more
than fireman, since we cannot sustain, politically or economically,
the funds necessary to make it a lender of last resort?
2. How do we ensure the optimum effectiveness of our
Bretton Woods institutions? What are the most compelling
options for refocusing, refining, or redesigning them?
3. How do we achieve overall architectural coherence
between the IMF, World Bank, Asia Development Bank,
European Bank for Regional Development, and other international
financial institutions?
4. What prescriptions should be offered regarding capital
account liberalization and exchange rate volatility?
5. What further steps could be taken to address the private
sector moral hazard issue?
We need to address the general malaise associated with globalization.
1. How can we provide a solid foundation for new WTO
negotiations, and build support for the development of an agenda
for trade negotiations?
2. What are the most effective actions to be taken to
encourage the modernization of governance structures?
3. How can we promote most effectively the results of the
OECD work on corporate governance expected next spring.
To deal with the social impacts, it is important that the social
consequences of the economic and financial crises be addressed.
1. How could the G-7 scope be broadened to address social
impacts and adjustment measures in affected economies?
2. How can we most effectively encourage the development
of social safety nets and skills development in affected economies?
3. How do we achieve more buy-in and coherence across
international institutions and fora? How do we foster a greater
role in the area of social impacts for the OECD and APEC?
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V. CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION
In view of the observations offered by the other panelists, permit me
to share some personal views on recent proposals to amend the IMF
Articles of Agreement to give the Fund an explicit role to promote capital
account liberalization. I understand that capital account liberalization in
this context refers to removal of restrictions on inward and outward flows
of investment and other types of capital, including cross-border flows of
stocks, bonds and bank deposits. I also understand Mr. Holder's remarks
to suggest that current proposals might exclude direct foreign investment
from the purview of the proposed IMF oversight of liberalization.
In my view, it would seem appropriate to have the Articles of
Agreement recognize explicitly that liberalization of international capital
movements is a "specific purpose" of the Fund. I believe, however, that
much more analysis is needed before giving the Fund more specific rule-
making or enforcement role, for several reasons.
First, several international fora have some oversight of international
capital markets, including the WTO, the BIS, and the OECD. As
suggested by my question on international architecture earlier, we should
be working towards an appropriate division of labour between relevant
international organizations active in the area.
Second, taking the financial sector as an example, many countries
permit capital movements to be constrained in circumstances where
prudential supervision demands restraint. Indeed, the NAFTA explicitly
recognizes prudential exceptions to liberalization of financial services
activities. In considering oversight, we should ask whether the IMF is
better placed than other international bodies to assess the legitimacy of such
measures.
Third, speaking from some experience as a trade negotiator, I would
note that the NAFTA, as well as U.S. bilateral investment treaties (BITs),
Canadian Foreign Investment Protection Agreements (FIPAs), and
thousands of other bilateral investment agreements around the world
provide for investment liberalization, with implications for the capital
account, subject however to explicit and diverse exceptions. Excluding
direct foreign investment from IMF rule-making may not be sufficient to
afford full respect for the exceptions in these agreements (for example,
U.S. legislative restrictions on foreign ownership of newspapers or
airlines), since the agreements cover both portfolio and direct investment.
Fourth, even if filing of exceptions were to be contemplated,
experience suggests that these kinds of restrictions are more effectively
liberalized in the context of bilaterally or multilaterally negotiated
reductions. Even if such exceptions were permitted, absent significant new
resources for administration and dispute settlement, the IMF would not
appear to have the institutional capacity to resolve differences that may
arise.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In a recent article entitled Glimmers of Hope, Jeffrey Sachs stated:
"Financial crises are tragic and largely unnecessary, short-run phenomena.
It bears emphasizing that East Asia's and the rest of the world's,
challenges will not end with the end of the financial crisis. In fact, the true
hard work will begin again." We recognize that it is a fact of our rapidly
changing and challenging global economy that "the true hard work" never
really ends, that there are always more and different questions to grapple
with, and, hopefully, that there are new and innovative solutions to be put
into real effect.
